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Miller v. Alabama: What It Is,  




I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Miller v. Alabama,1 the Supreme Court of the United States, in a five 
to four opinion written by Justice Elena Kagan, held that mandatory life im-
prisonment without parole for defendants convicted of murder who were un-
der age eighteen at the time of their crimes violated the Eighth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.2  The decision raises a host of important ques-
tions that the University of Missouri School of Law’s recent symposium ably 
addressed.  Is Miller a watershed opinion, prefiguring a new era of substan-
tive Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that would apply to other imprison-
ment sentences across offender and offense categories?  Does it suggest a 
new constitutional procedural right to individualized sentencing for terms of 
imprisonment just as the Court has required for the death penalty – even cast-
ing doubt on mandatory sentences in other areas?  Or is it a limited extension 
of the Court’s “death is different” jurisprudence to what some have called the 
“living death sentence,”3 excluding one generic offender category and raising 
the possibility that other generic offender categories may also be excluded as 
they have been in death penalty jurisprudence?  Or even if it applies “only” to 
juvenile mandatory life sentences, what are its implications for other areas 
involving juveniles and the criminal justice system?  I offer tentative answers 
to these questions; others may disagree with this proposition.  
Sadly, I do not believe that Miller has ushered in a general “right to    
individualized sentencing,” let alone a constitutional right to proportionality 
analysis in imprisonment cases, at least not given the current composition    
of the Supreme Court.  As I describe below, our Supreme Court – unlike oth-
er common law high courts – has resisted such an analysis in its Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence; this resistance is unlikely to fade any time soon.  
To put it mildly, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence thus far has been a       
less than powerful tool to deal with the extraordinary prison terms that we 
have been imposing on defendants across this country for the past three dec-
  
 * Professor of Practice, Harvard Law School; United States District Court 
Judge (D.Mass.) (Retired). 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).  Evan Miller was fourteen years old at the time he 
committed a homicide, for which he received the mandatory minimum sentence of 
life without the possibility of parole.  Id. at 2460.  
 2. Id. at 2475. 
 3. See, e.g., People v. Hartzol, 222 Ill. App. 3d 631, 655 (1991). 
1
Gertner: Gertner: Miller v. Alabama: What It Is
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: Gertner – Final Formatting 2/23/2014 Created on:  3/18/2014 3:13:00 PM Last Printed: 4/10/2014 2:46:00 PM 
1042 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
ades.4  It has been a less than powerful tool to address three strikes laws that 
impose onerous and plainly disproportionate terms for repeat petty offenders.5  
It has been a less than powerful tool to stop America’s failed experiment with 
mass incarceration.6  
While scholars have argued that the Eighth Amendment requires a pro-
portionality analysis – in other words, “that punishment for crime should be 
graduated and proportioned to [the] offense”7 – this view has not found pur-
chase on the Court.  Indeed, some justices have not merely rejected the ap-
proach, they have suggested that the inquiry itself is illegitimate.8  Propor-
tionality analysis, as Justice Antonin Scalia has suggested, is not even part of 
the American judicial role in sentencing at all; it is normative, policy-like – 
the responsibility and prerogative of the legislature and not the courts.9  In 
fact, as I suggest below, part of the appeal of Miller and Graham v. Florida10 
may be that the petitioners’ arguments were based not on norms, policy 
choices, or values.11  Rather, the arguments were based on science – the 
teachings of neuroscience that suggest meaningful physical differences be-
tween the adult and juvenile brains.12 
In death penalty cases, the Court has been willing to engage in a propor-
tionality analysis but only at the margins – that is, only with respect to certain 
generic offenses and offender categories.13  Miller and Graham may well 
  
 4. See Nancy Gertner, On Competence, Legitimacy, and Proportionality, 160 
U. PA. L. REV. 1585 (2012) [hereinafter On Competence, Legitimacy, and Propor-
tionality] (describing the limitations of Eighth Amendment law in part because of the 
American understanding of the limits of the competence of courts to make value 
judgments about sentencing).  
 5. Id. at 1590. 
 6. See Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 261, 261 (2009).  
 7. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (quoting Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)); see generally Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional 
Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 695-98 (2005).  
 8. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31-32 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
On Competence, Legitimacy, and Proportionality, supra note 4, at 1589-90. 
 9. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32; On Competence, Legitimacy and Proportionality, 
supra note 4, at 1590.  
 10. 130 S. Ct. 2011.  Terence Graham was a seventeen year old who received a 
sentence of life without parole for violating parole on an earlier conviction for a non-
homicide crime, namely armed burglary with assault or battery and attempted armed 
robbery.  Id. at 2018-20.  The parole violation involved allegations that Graham had 
participated in a home invasion.  Id. at 2018-19.  No further charges were brought on 
the new offense.  See id. at 2019.  Rather, it formed the basis for the revocation of his 
probation on the earlier charges, receiving the maximum available penalty of life 
without parole.  See id. at 2019-20.  
 11. See id. at 2026. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Lee, supra note 7, at 716-17. 
2
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follow the same pattern.  While they may not open the door to constitutional-
ly compelled proportionality analysis – at least not yet – they may well do so 
with respect to the exclusion of other generic categories from mandatory life 
without parole sentences.  
On the surface, Miller – and before that, Graham – surely seemed dif-
ferent.  While the Court spoke in the same generic terms as it had in earlier 
cases, the context of the decisions, their application to imprisonment rather 
than just the death penalty, and especially the Court’s language suggested a 
significant change.14  Miller referred broadly to a “requirement of individual-
ized sentencing for defendants facing the most serious penalties,”15 implying 
a procedural right in ordinary sentencing analogous to the right to an individ-
ualized determination of the application of the death penalty.  Indeed, neuro-
science, a field upon which the majority relied,16 may one day open the door 
to individualized consideration of the brain mechanisms that affect impulse 
control, aggression, anger, or even mood instability.17  In Miller, the Court 
finally seemed willing to impose limitations on legislative enactments, and 
thus exert a judicial check on the punishment process.   
But Miller’s holding is cabined with restrictions.  It barred the automatic 
imposition of life without parole sentences on juveniles, not the imposition of 
life without parole sentences generally.18  And though it strongly suggested 
that sentencing juveniles to life without parole is illegitimate, it did not bar its 
use in toto.19  The Court was also careful to confine its decision to a specific 
combination of a particular type of sentence and offender.20  It applies to cas-
es involving both mandatory life without parole and juvenile offenders – not 
all sentences of imprisonment, much less all sentences of life imprisonment, 
or all offender categories.21    
Nevertheless, Miller is a watershed opinion, if only for its effect on ju-
venile sentencing.  Rightly or wrongly, Miller has changed the conversation 
on juvenile punishment from a general and important one about the evolving 
standards of decency, to one of fact, evidence, and even science.  If the juve-
nile brain is so distinct and different from that of an adult, and if those differ-
ences are so clear that they can be demonstrated in functional Magnetic Res-
onance Imaging (fMRI) and scientific studies, we may need to change the 
way we treat juvenile offenders.  This includes reconsidering the circum-
  
 14. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011. 
 15. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.  
 16. Id. at 2464-66. 
 17. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Respon-
sibility but Treatment, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1103 (2008); Stephen J. Morse, Brain 
Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 397 (2006).  
 18. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
3
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stances under which juvenile offenders are transferred to adult courts, the 
circumstances of their detention or interrogation, the capacity of juveniles for 
rehabilitation both within and without institutions, and the programs that ju-
veniles receive.   
II.  EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS:  
BEFORE MILLER 
The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment case law reflects a continuing 
debate regarding whether the Constitution compels a constitutional propor-
tionality principle for non-capital cases at all.22  To some Supreme Court jus-
tices, proportionality analysis is not within the competency of the American 
judiciary or, worse yet, is not even within a judge’s legitimate role.23  As I 
have described elsewhere, according to this view “[proportionality analysis in 
criminal justice] is somehow too policy-centered, too ‘activist.’  It is a task 
best left to the legislature, or in the case of the federal sentencing guidelines, 
to an ‘independent’ agency in the judicial branch the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission.”24    
The debate played out most acutely in Ewing v. California.25  In Ewing, 
a plurality of the Court held that a sentence is not unconstitutionally excessive 
so long as it can be justified under any one of the traditional justifications for 
punishment.26  To the plurality, the fact that the Constitution is not clear re-
garding the metes and bounds of “cruel and unusual punishment” as applied 
to imprisonment27 means that the Court should not venture far to critically 
  
 22. Lee, supra note 7, at 692.  
 23. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
 24. On Competence, Legitimacy, and Proportionality, supra note 4, at 1587.  In 
fact, these attitudes are reflected not merely in constitutional litigation.  They are 
currently reflected in the appeals courts’ inability to give meaning to substantive rea-
sonableness sentencing review, even after United States v. Booker freed them to do 
so, and even in light of the United States Sentencing Commission’s inability to rank 
offenses based on any coherent proportionality principle.  
 25. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).  
 26. Id. at 25, 29-30 (plurality opinion).  In Ewing, no position had a majority 
other than the general holding that the punishment was constitutionally valid. See id. 
at 30 (plurality opinion); id. at 32 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
The plurality opinion of Justice O’Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Kennedy. Id. at 14 (plurality opinion). 
 27. See id. at 21-24.  Small wonder; at the time of the Constitution’s drafting, 
there were few penitentiaries. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Criminal Law: Understanding 
Penal Reform: The Dynamic of Change, 80 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 726, 729-730 
(1989) (describing the movement concentrated between 1790 and 1830, from the 
“gallows, whipping post, stocks, and pillory” to “massive structures [i.e. peniten-
tiaries], built in urban and rural areas, designed for collective incarceration and reform 
of a region’s criminals).  Most crimes were capital offenses.  Nancy Gertner, A Short 
History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. 
 
4
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evaluate prison terms.  To choose one penological purpose over others and 
evaluate the sentence in reference to that purpose would be to overstep the 
Court’s role.  Therefore, where imprisonment was concerned, the Court was 
simply not a significant institutional player.28  Since the “traditional justifica-
tions of punishment” – retribution, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deter-
rence – can justify virtually anything when broadly construed, the Court’s 
decision amounts to a near absolute deference to the legislature’s choices of 
punishments.29  In effect, a prison term can never be cruel and unusual no 
matter how long.30   
As a result, the Court sustained a twenty-five years to life sentence un-
der California’s three strikes law, triggered by Ewing’s conviction for steal-
ing three golf clubs while on parole from a nine-year prison term and after 
accumulating a lengthy criminal record (largely for theft).31  General, ill-
defined notions of deterrence and incapacitation were sufficient to justify the 
sentence.32  According to the plurality, “[t]he recidivism statute is nothing 
more than a societal decision that when such a person commits yet another 
felony, he should be subjected to the admittedly serious penalty of incarcera-
tion for life, subject only to the State’s judgment as to whether to grant him 
parole.”33  And, the plurality continued, the legislature is better suited to 
make “societal decisions” than the Court: “[F]ederal courts should be reluc-
tant to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment, and . . . success-
ful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences should be exceed-
ingly rare.”34  “Indeed, Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, was char-
acteristically more emphatic: The proportionality principle, unmasked, raises 
policy questions, not issues of law, and policy questions do not belong in the 
courts.”35  As Justice Clarence Thomas noted, the Eighth Amendment’s cruel 
  
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 692-94 (2010); see Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. 
Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 
928 (1994).  
 28. See Lee, supra note 7, at 729 n.246.  
 29. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29-31 (plurality opinion); Lee, supra note 7, at 682. 
 30. Justice John Paul Stevens, concurring in Graham, underscored the centrality 
of proportionality review in cases of imprisonment.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2011, 2036 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).  He said, “[U]nless we are to abandon the 
moral commitment embodied in the Eighth Amendment, proportionality review must 
never become effectively obsolete.”  Id.  
 31. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 17-20, 30-31 (plurality opinion). 
 32. Id. at 29-30. 
 33. Id. at 21 (quoting Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 278 (1980)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 34. Id. at 22 (quoting Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  
 35. On Competence, Legitimacy, and Proportionality, supra note 4, at 1589-90 
(citing Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring)).  Justice Scalia stated:  
Perhaps the plurality should revise its terminology, so that what it reads into 
the Eighth Amendment is not the unstated proposition that all punishment 
 
5
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and unusual clause does not contain a “proportionality principle.”36  Rather, it 
“leaves the unavoidably moral question of who ‘deserves’ a particular 
nonprohibited method of punishment to the judgment of the legislatures that 
authorize the penalty. . . .”37 
Significantly, the Court in Ewing – and earlier in Solem v. Helm38 – rec-
ognized, but did not apply, an empirical, comparative approach that was more 
determinate and more than just some diffuse choice amongst values, as Jus-
tice Scalia suggested.  The Solem approach looks to three factors to determine 
whether a sentence is so disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amend-
ment: “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the 
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the 
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”39  
Factors (ii) and (iii) root the Court’s evaluation in concrete facts – how the 
same jurisdiction punishes other crimes and how other jurisdictions punish 
the same crime – in much the same way as an equal protection analysis.40  
Nevertheless, the plurality in Ewing refused to apply this approach in all 
Eighth Amendment cases dealing with imprisonment.41  On the contrary, it 
held that the Eighth Amendment “‘did not mandate’ [a] comparative analysis 
‘within and between jurisdictions.’”42 
The Ewing plurality’s approach, as a general matter, contradicts that of 
common law courts around the world.43  Proportionality analysis is a quintes-
sential judicial methodology, essential in dealing with criminal punishment.44  
Although its meaning varies in different settings, it is the currency of consti-
  
should be reasonably proportionate to the gravity of the offense, but rather the 
unstated proposition that all punishment should reasonably pursue the multiple 
purposes of the criminal law. That formulation would make it clearer than ev-
er, of course, that the plurality is not applying law but evaluating policy.  
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 36. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 37. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2045 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 38. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).  
 39. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 22 (plurality opinion) (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 292) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 40. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he 
practical difficulties of defining the requirements imposed by equal protection, while 
not insignificant, do not involve the judiciary in the same degree of value-based line-
drawing that the Supreme Court . . . found so troublesome in defining the contours of 
substantive due process.”), vacated and aff’d on other grounds, 875 F. 2d 699 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (en banc).  
 41. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23 (plurality opinion) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 
501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in          
the judgment)). 
 42. Id. (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004-05). 
 43. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, Proportionality and Principled Balancing, 4 LAW & 
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1, 9-10 (2010). 
 44. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290. 
6
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tutional analysis for common law high courts,45 as well as the lingua franca 
in ordinary sentencing.46   
III.  DEATH PENALTY AND PROPORTIONALITY 
Notwithstanding these general trends, death penalty jurisprudence be-
fore Miller and Graham was sui generis – the “death is different” rationale.47  
Under this rationale, the Court has been willing to draw substantive limits and 
impose procedural requirements.48  The substantive limits, as I have suggest-
ed, comprise proportionality analyses at the margins – the determination that 
there are “mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the 
severity of a penalty,”49 based on the “evolving standards of decency.”50  As 
such, the Court has concluded that the death penalty is disproportionately 
harsh for certain categories of offenses, such as non-homicide offenses or 
rape,51 and for certain categories of offenders; namely, those under the age of 
eighteen52 or those who are mentally disabled.53  In effect, the Court’s majori-
ty considers itself competent to create broad rules with respect to the binary 
determination of life or death, but not with respect to the scalable punish-
ments like imprisonment.   
In addition, the Court obviously has faith in its competence to carve out 
procedural rules for the death penalty that cut across offender categories and 
the legitimacy of the enterprise.  Procedural rules, as the late Professor Wil-
liam Stuntz observed, are easy for courts.54  The imposition of the death pen-
  
 45. See generally Barak, supra note 44; Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional 
About Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 803 (2004) (reviewing DAVID M. 
BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004)). 
 46. Richard G. Singer, Proportionate Thoughts About Proportionality, 8 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 217, 217 (2010) (reviewing E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. 
FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE 
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS (2008)). 
 47. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Consti-
tutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145,    
1146 (2009). 
 48. See id.  
 49. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012).  
 50. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008).  
 51. Id. at 446; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).  
 52. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that the execution of a 
person who was under 18 years of age at the time of his or her offense violated the 
Eight Amendment); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality 
opinion) (holding that the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the 
time of his or her offense violated the Eight Amendment).  
 53. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).   
 54. See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE (2011).  
7
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alty, for example, requires a death-qualified jury,55 and in an area most rele-
vant to Miller, an individualized determination by that jury considering the 
characteristics of the defendant and the details of his offense. 56   
IV.  MILLER, GRAHAM AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
Graham was the first decision in which the Court applied the Eighth 
Amendment to effect what Justice Kagan rightly characterized as an “unprec-
edented” ban on a sentence’s use for a term of imprisonment.57  It barred the 
application of a life without parole sentence for juveniles in cases that did not 
involve a homicide.58  Miller went further, addressing mandatory life without 
parole for juveniles in a homicide prosecution, but it did so narrowly.59  The 
issue was not the length of the sentence itself, or even the fact that the offend-
er could never qualify for parole.  Rather, the issue was the automatic nature 
of the punishment’s imposition.60  A mandatory life without parole sentence 
“prevents those meting out punishment from considering a juvenile’s ‘less-
ened culpability’ and greater ‘capacity for change’ and runs afoul of our cas-
es’ requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most 
serious penalties.”61 
To be sure, Justice Kagan’s rationale and language are much broader 
than the holding.  The right to an individualized sentence for defendants fac-
ing “the most serious penalties” is a right that could apply as well to mandato-
ry life without parole as to a mandatory minimum twenty or twenty-five year 
term.62  The decision even reaffirms a proportional approach to sentencing in 
general.63  The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment, the Court notes, “flows from the basic precept . . . that punish-
ment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to both the offender and 
the offense.”64 
  
 55. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).   
 56. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).  
 57. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. 
Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
 58. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
 59. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.  
 60. Id. at 2475. 
 61. Id. at 2460 (citations omitted) (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27,  
2029-30). 
 62. See Michael M. O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller to 
Adults, 78 MO. L. REV. 1087 (2013) (suggesting how an Eighth Amendment balanc-
ing approach might apply to the mandatory life without parole sentence established by 
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) for repeat drug offenders). 
 63. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463. 
 64. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
8
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And as to the question of competence – or the ability of courts to con-
duct this kind of analysis – Justice Kagan emphasizes the teachings of neuro-
science first articulated in Graham.65  Her analysis is not just the armchair 
musings of parent, or the normative judgments of a policy maker;66 this is 
science.  As in Graham, the Court underscores the fact that “developments in 
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences be-
tween juvenile and adult minds,” especially in “parts of the brain involved in 
behavior control.”67  Significantly, the juvenile brain is perfectible, with 
greater prospects for reform.68  That science makes it difficult to say – as the 
plurality did in Ewing69 – that a mandatory life without parole sentence was 
justified by any penological purpose and makes judicial deference to such 
sentences impossible.  
The principles articulated by the majority could apply to any non-parole 
sentence of a juvenile, or to any punishment that fails to allow for a juvenile’s 
capacity for growth and change.  It could even apply to any lengthy term of 
years for a juvenile.  More generally, if there were anything like a right to an 
individualized sentence for defendants facing the most serious penalties, it 
would cast a shadow on lengthy mandatory minimum sentences where, for 
example, the imposition of a twenty-year term follows directly from a judge 
or jury’s finding of liability.   
The Court’s analysis of what individualized sentencing might have 
looked like in this case strongly disfavors a life term for almost any eighteen 
year old.  The characteristics that the Court highlighted could well be found 
in a number of juvenile cases.  With respect to the crime, Kuntrell Jackson, 
the other defendant whose case was consolidated with Evan Miller’s before 
the Supreme Court, was simply an aider and abettor, which is hardly unusu-
al.70  Juveniles are typically “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative in-
fluences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”71  Jackson found out 
on the way to the video store – the scene of the crime – that one of his friends 
had a gun, but his age could have affected his understanding of the risk.72  As 
compared to adults, juveniles lack maturity and have “an underdeveloped 
sense of responsibility.”73  Also, while he had a family background of vio-
  
 65. Id. at 2464-65. 
 66. See id. at 2464 (“Our decisions rested not only on common sense – on what 
‘any parent knows’ – but on science and social science as well.”). 
 67. Id. at 2464 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  
 68. Id. at 2458. 
 69. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31(2003) (plurality opinion).  
 70. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 
 71. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 72. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 73. Id. at 2464 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569) (internal quotation marks    
omitted). 
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lence,74 this background did not necessarily forecast his future.  Juveniles 
have characters that are “not as well formed” as those of adults, with a greater 
capacity for change.75  Miller, who actually committed the homicide, was 
drunk and high on drugs that had been consumed with his adult victim.76  
Thus, the Court noted, “That Miller deserved severe punishment for killing 
[the victim] is beyond question.  But . . . a sentencer needed to examine all 
these circumstances before concluding that life without any possibility of 
parole was the appropriate penalty.”77 
In fact, the majority’s characterization of a right to an individualized 
sentencing comes closer than any recent decision to what is described in Aus-
tralia as “intuitive synthesis,”78 a sentencing approach “in which all relevant 
considerations are simultaneously unified, balanced, and weighed by the sen-
tencing judge.”79  Australian judges have eschewed any effort by legislatures 
to systematize sentencing with guidelines, formulae, and numbers that would 
anchor their analysis, underscoring the institutional role of judges in sentenc-
ing individuals.80  
But the Court went to great lengths to suggest that it had not gone so far, 
and that this was the familiar categorical approach married to a familiar pro-
cedural one – the right to an individualized sentence for the harshest impris-
onment sanction, but only with respect to a particular category of offenders: 
juveniles.81  It was not life without parole that triggered the constitutional 
objection for those under eighteen years old; it was the mandatory nature of 
the punishment.82  The Court melded the “death is different” approach, now 
extended to mandatory life without parole sentences, to the “children are dif-
ferent” principles of Graham.83  
  
 74. Id. at 2468. 
 75. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).  
 76. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
 77. Id. at 2469.  
 78. Sarah Krasnostein & Arie Freiberg, Pursuing Consistency in an Individualis-
tic Sentencing Framework: If You Know Where You’re Going, How Do You Know 
When You’ve Got There?,  76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 268 (2013) (citing 
Markarian v. The Queen, 228 CLR 347, 374 (2005)). 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 269. 
 81. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 82. Id. at 2463-64. 
 83. Id. at 2470.  The Court distinguishes Harmelin v. Michigan, in which the 
Court upheld a mandatory life without parole sentence for a defendant convicted of 
possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine, reasoning that “a sentence which is not 
otherwise cruel and unusual [does not become] so simply because it is ‘mandatory.’”  
Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991)).  While individualized 
sentencing applied in the death penalty context, it did not apply to non capital cases 
“because of the qualitative difference between death and all other penalties.” Harmel-
in, 501 U.S. at 995.  Harmelin, the Court noted, “had nothing to do with children.”  
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470.  “[A] sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so 
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V.  MILLER AND OTHER GENERIC CATEGORIES 
To be sure, as the symposium’s panels suggested, Miller may lead the 
way to the exclusion of other categories of offenders that neuroscience shows 
are the functional equivalents of adolescent offenders.  One could envision 
the Court considering data that shows that a class of defendants with a partic-
ular diagnosis of mental impairment has a distinctive fMRI signature mirror-
ing that of an adolescent.  Or one could present the brain profiles of addicts, 
which may well present like those of juveniles, to the extent that they demon-
strate an impaired capacity for impulse control together with meaningful ca-
pacity to change with treatment over time.84  Miller might also be extended to 
juvenile sentences that are the functional equivalent of life imprisonment – a 
mandatory minimum lengthy term of years.  The analysis may not be a broad 
proportionality approach or a general right to an individualized sentence but it 
would extend Miller to categories comparable to the under eighteen category 
or mandatory “life without parole” category. 
VI.  MILLER AND JUVENILES 
One thing is clear: Miller and Graham surely opened up a new discus-
sion about the criminal justice system’s approach to juveniles.  It has argua-
bly put the brakes on the movements of the past decades, which have seen 
juvenile offenders treated more and more as adults.85  In addition, it has 
sparked meaningful debate about whether or not children should receive adult 
sentences, which is now grounded in data and science; that debate is being 
played out in both federal and state courts.86  To take one example, courts 
have been grappling with the impact of Miller on the consideration of wheth-
er adult convictions stemming from crimes committed before the age of 
eighteen can count towards the career offender sentencing provisions of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.87  
  
for children.”  Id.  Just as “death is different,” the Court noted, “children are different 
too.”  Id.  
 84. To be sure, the analogy is imperfect. Neither addicts nor the mentally im-
paired necessarily present the same picture as that of an adolescent that the Court 
painted, namely capability to be reformed.  See, e.g. Richard A. Millstein and Alan I. 
Leshner, The Science of Addiction: Research and Public Health Perspectives, 3 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 151, 156 (1999).  
 85. See Kimberly Larson, Frank DiCataldo, & Robert Kinscherff, Miller v.   
Alabama: Implications for Forensic Mental Health Assessment at the Intersection     
of Social Science and the Law, 39 NEW ENG. J. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 319,             
322-23 (2013). 
 86. See, e.g., Chambers v. Minnesota, 831 N.W.2d 311, 328-29 (Minn. 2013). 
 87. See generally Andrew Tunnard, Not-So-Sweet Sixteen: When Minor Convic-
tions Have Major Consequences Under Career Offender Guidelines, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. 1309 (2013).  
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There is judicial resistance to these proposed changes, deriving perhaps 
from decades of judicial evasion of all Eighth Amendment challenges, despite 
the imposition of legislative punishments that were progressively onerous  
and disproportionate.  Some courts have refused to apply Miller at all,      
concluding that it is not retroactive.88  Other courts have ignored the deci-
sion’s broad themes, focusing instead on its narrow holding and going so    
far as to reaffirm lengthy sentences for juveniles after an ostensibly “individ-
ualized” determination.89  A bill has been proposed in the Texas Senate     
that would require a life sentence for murder, adding parole eligibility after 
forty years.90  The Texas House indicated that it wants to give juries the   
option to sentence seventeen year olds to life without parole so long as other 
factors are considered.91 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Let me be clear: Miller is not about an activist court meddling with    
legislative prerogatives, as the dissenting justices would suggest.  Rather, this 
is about a Court finally – finally – calling a halt to ceding all punishment  
decisions to the legislature without a modicum of judicial and constitutional 
checks and balances.  While the stunted role that the Supreme Court has 
adopted for itself in Eighth Amendment challenges has led to a limited    
holding in this case – limited by the sentence, mandatory life imprisonment, 
and by the age of the offender, under eighteen – the Court’s willingness        
to critically evaluate a legislature’s draconian punishments in the light of 
scientific data offers the possibility that it will put the brakes on America’s 
carceral state.  
 
  
 88. Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 328-29. 
 89. See, e.g., United States v. Nguyen, CR 2:99-00433-05 WBS, 2013 WL 
2151558, at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2013). 
 90. Brandi Grissom, Young Killers Await Change in Mandatory Life Sentences, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2013, at A15. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/05/us/young-
killers-in-texas-await-change-in-mandatory-life-sentences.html. 
 91. Id.   
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